GENERAL ELECTION 2000

In the June 2000 general election for the House of Representatives, the ruling coalition held on to a majority, but all three of its constituent parties lost seats: The Liberal Democratic Party went from a preelection strength of 271 to 233, the New Kômeitô from 42 to 31, and the New Conservative Party from 18 to 7. Even allowing for the fact that the total number of seats in the lower house was cut this time from 500 to 480, the declines were substantial. On the opposition side, by contrast, the Democratic Party of Japan went from 95 seats to 127, the Liberal Party from 18 to 22, and the Social Democratic Party from 14 to 19. The only opposition group to lose seats was the Japanese Communist Party, which slipped from 26 to 20.

The voter turnout rate was 62.5%, slightly better than in the previous lower house election in October 1996. But unfortunately the results of the voting were not definitive. The electorate did not set forth a clear picture of how they wished their political leadership to deal with the various problems that Japan currently confronts.

The rate of support for Prime Minister Mori Yoshirô had dipped below 20% before the election. In general, a support rate of under 30% is considered a yellow light for a Japanese prime minister, and a rate of under 20% is considered a red light. Ordinarily an administration led by such an unpopular figure could not hope to win an election. And in fact the LDP did suffer. The sudden incapacitation and later death of former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizô ought to have produced a crop of sympathy votes for his party, but Mori dissipated this prospective gain with his unguarded comments, specifically, his reference to Japan as a “divine country” and his suggestion that the LDP could hope to do well if uncommitted voters would sleep in on election day.

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In other democracies, it is inconceivable that a group led by such an unpopular person could win an election. For example, John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher as Britain’s Conservative Party leader and prime minister, but because he was not as popular as Labour Party leader Tony Blair, his party was voted out of power and Blair replaced him at 10 Downing Street.

Why in Japan’s case was it possible for the ruling coalition to win despite Mori’s dismal poll figures? The first reason is that Japan’s lower house does not have a system made up entirely of single-member electoral districts, such as is found in countries like Britain. Instead there are 300 local districts with one seat each plus 180 members chosen by proportional representation. This means that people can express displeasure with the LDP as a whole by voting against it in the proportional-representation balloting but still vote for the LDP candidate in their local district if they approve of his or her caliber as an individual. In fact, this sort of split voting took place on a large scale in the June election. In the proportional-representation voting, the LDP saw its support eroded primarily by the DPJ, the top opposition party. But the Liberals and Social Democrats also did well; it seems likely that they won votes from people wanting to express their opposition to the LDP, with conservatives voting for the right-wing Liberal Party and progressives voting for the left-wing SDP.

Another reason for the indecisive outcome was the lack of a popular alternative leader. Unlike Britain’s Blair, whose popularity was instrumental in Labour’s victory, DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio is not especially well liked by the electorate. Furthermore, his image of authority as head of the top opposition party was hurt by his open split with his brother Kunio, who had joined with him in establishing the DPJ but who decided to run as an LDP candidate in this year’s election.

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A third factor was probably the lack of major policy issues. Now that the cold war is over, there are no major foreign policy matters on which the ruling and opposition parties are sharply divided. As for economic policy, neither side came out with a clear stance on the question of whether the priority should be to achieve a recovery or to start cutting the bloated budget deficit. Nor did they offer concrete proposals for dealing with the pressing issues of pensions and long-term care for the elderly. So voters really had no way of choosing parties on the basis of their policies.

A fourth reason for the outcome was the campaign cooperation that the LDP received from its coalition partners. In the proportional-representation balloting the LDP got only 28.3% of the vote, but in the single-member districts its vote share was 41.0%, thanks largely to Kômeitô support. In many local districts the Kômeitô ran no candidate of its own but instead endorsed the LDP candidate. And it appears that the bulk of the party’s supporters dutifully supported the LDP candidate in these districts. (By contrast, in those districts where the LDP endorsed a Kômeitô candidate, LDP supporters were less willing to vote accordingly.)

Though the election results failed to deliver a clear mandate, one thing they did reveal was a split between the big cities and the less urbanized regions. In the big cities the DPJ came out ahead, while in the regions the LDP won by a landslide. Rural voters have benefited from the pork-barreling public works projects and other favors directed toward them by their Liberal Democratic legislators, and they reciprocated with their support on election day. But urban voters have not received such favors, and so they were more likely to vote against the LDP. In other words, party support was determined with very little connection to the policy stances of the parties in question.

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The basically backward-looking June election also revealed that, as in the case of the economy, Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s is casting a deep shadow on the political scene. In 1992 the Japan New Party was formed, and the following year it won enough votes to join forces with other parties and push the LDP out of power for the first time in close to four decades. But JNP leader Hosokawa Morihiro gave up his position as prime minister before accomplishing his camp's reform goals; his successor Hata Tsutomu held on to power only briefly, and then the LDP regained control.

Today’s Japanese lack a vision of their future and have lost most of their self-confidence. A party that could help them regain this self-confidence and present a hopeful image of the future would surely win wide support. If the DPJ were to come out with the right set of policies, it could probably turn much of its present passive support (from those who oppose the LDP but are not especially enthusiastic about the DPJ per se) into more active backing. It is probably fair to say that the substantial vote share that the DPJ managed to garner in the June election represented its endorsement by voters as a party that is potentially capable of running the government. In other words, if the Democrats play their cards correctly, they have a chance of winning power in the next election.

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In any case, no truly national party can rely on support just from the cities or just from the countryside. The DPJ needs to think seriously about policies to revive the regions, farming communities in particular. And the LDP needs to come up with a solid set of policies for the big cities. Which of the two will be first to overcome its current area of weakness? The answer to this question will have a major bearing on the future course of Japanese politics.

The present electoral system for the lower house, adopted six years ago, is also a major problem. Many people criticize it, and some are even calling for a return to the previous system, under which individual districts were represented by up to five members. Others support a further reduction in the weight of the proportional-representation contingent (cut from 200 to 180 this time) so as to increase the weight of the single-member districts and thereby encourage the emergence of a true two-party system.

The House of Councillors, the second chamber of the National Diet, is also in urgent need of reform. Its electoral system is essentially the same as that now used for the House of Representatives (a combination of local districts and proportional representation), and this prevents it from maintaining its distinctiveness. Next summer half the upper house seats will be up for election; if no party emerges with a majority, the current political instability will continue. Also, even if a party wins a lower house majority, unless it has a majority in the upper house, it will need to govern by coalition in order to secure smooth passage for its legislation.

Will the ruling coalition decide to replace the unpopular Mori with a different leader before next year’s upper house election, or will it stick with him? The answer is likely to have a major effect on the future realignment of political forces. Though the surface of the mountain appears calm, huge flows of magma are beginning to gather force underground. (Masuzoe Yôichi, political scientist)

© 2000 Japan Echo Inc.